Abstract: In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. The characteristic of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modelled by uniform pricing auctions is analyzed and a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auctions is proposed. Spot markets are assumed to be operated as uniform pricing auctions and generation companies are assumed to submit their bids into the auctions in the form of a seal-bid. The uniform pricing auctions in this analysis are formulated as non-cooperative and static games in which generation companies correspond to the players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is assigned to the strategy of the playern (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. Based on the concept of residual demand, best response functions of each generation company in the N-company auctions are analytically derived. Finally, an efficient way to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums are suggested. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to show the basic ideas of the proposed method.
INTRODUCTION
The electric power industry is changing into a competitive marketplace for power transactions, and profitability is a primary concern to every market player (Schwarz, 2000; Nishimura, et al., 1993) . Basically, the power transaction revenues of a generation firm are from bilateral contracts or the spot markets, which are usually formed as a sealed bid auction with uniform market prices (Singh, et al., 1997; Rahmi, et al., 1999) . In this environment, the optimal bidding strategy, to maximize the profit from the spot market, is indispensable to the generation firms.
In recent years, considerable amounts of research have been done in decision-making in competitive power markets, which are focused on the optimal bidding strategies for the competitive generation firms (Sheble, 1996; Ferrero, et al. 1997; Park, at al., 2001; Rudkevich, et al., 1998; Kim, et al., 2002) .
Privatized generation firms can decide their bidding strategies based on various theoretical or empirical studies, e.g., forecasts of market prices, evaluation of competitors' bidding behavior, and game theory applications (IEEE, 1999) . Price based operations in an auction market structure are analyzed by Singh, et al., (1997) . Using the matrix game, where bidding strategy is represented with discrete quantities, decision-making processes in deregulated power systems are simulated (Rahmi, et al., 1999) .
In this paper, the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modelled by uniform pricing auctions are analyzed and a new analytical method to obtain Nash equilibriums of the auction using residual demands is proposed. Generation companies are considered as the players of the spot market. Depending on the bids of the generation companies, market demands are allocated to each generation company.
The uniform pricing auctions in this analysis is formulated as non-cooperative and static games in which generation companies compete with each other as the players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n is the strategy of the player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium based on the Nash idea. Based on the residual demand curve, the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N companies is derived, analytically.
Game Formulation.
As spot markets are modeled by uniform pricing auctions and the auction results are based on the interactions among companies in the spot markets, the auctions in this analysis can be formulated as a non-cooperative and static game in which generation companies correspond to players of the game. The coefficient of the bidding function of company-n, b , is the strategy of the player-n (company-n) and the payoff of player-n is defined as its profit from the uniform price auction. The solution of this game can be obtained using the concept of the non-cooperative equilibrium based on the Nash idea, and therefore, e solution strategies can be calculated as follows:
n In this paper, efficient ways to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as equilibriums in N-player generation markets are proposed. A simple numerical example with three companies is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed method. From this, the applicability of the proposed method to the realworld problem can be seen, even though it needs a further future analysis. 
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ANALYSIS OF NASH EQUILIBRIUMS

Classification of Companies 2. SIMPLIFIED MARKETS MODEL
In equilibriums, companies can be classified into two distinct sets. Two equilibrium sets of companies are defined according to the generation quantity allocated to the individual companies as follows:
Markets Model
It is assumed that spot markets are operated as uniform price auctions and that each generation company submits its bids into the auction in the form of a seal-bid.
Set of unconstrained companies
Set of constrained companies { | }:
The generation quantity allocated to and the maximum generation limit of generation company-n is denoted by q and , o r ,
At given market demands, companies can be classified into two equilibrium states (i.e., set of unconstrained and constrained companies) according to the slope of their bidding function, b as follows:
Basic assumptions are made on the market setups and some functions defined above. First, the number of generation companies in markets is N. Second, system demand is defined by an affine function such that it has an inverse given by Figure 1 shows an example of equilibrium, in which company-n and company-m is in the set of constrained and unconstrained companies, respectively.
Therefore, the residual demand decreases by the sum of the two amounts when price increases by one unit.
This implies that 1 res n ω can be represented as the sum of these two factors such as 1 1
For this residual demand, company-n can be regarded as a monopolist and its best response can be determined as the strategy of a monopolistic company as follows [Appendix]:
Best Response of Individual Companies Using Residual Demands
Based on the residual demand curve, the best response function of each generation company in the uniform pricing auction with N-company is obtained, analytically, in this paper. Suppose that an equilibrium set pair, ( ) , is given.
First, the best response of company-n, , can be determined as follows. In the inverse demand curve, U n∈Ω ω can be interpreted as the parameter that determines how much demand's willingness-to-pay decreases when demand increase by one unit. In the same way, the strategy b , can be interpreted as the parameter that represents how much company-n's willingness-to-earn increases when supply increases by one unit. However, it is more convenient to consider the reciprocal of these parameters since both consumers and suppliers respond to the price. That is, n 1 ω is the decreasing amount of demand when price increases by one unit and 1 is the increasing amount of company-n's supply when price increases by one unit.
Next, the best response of company-m, C m ∈ Ω , which is in the equilibrium set of constrained companies, can be obtained as follows. From Figure  1 , it can be seen that, for company-m in Ω , the best response at the equilibrium can be any value less
, where p is the market clearing price at the equilibrium. Therefore, from (5), market clearing price and the best response of company-m can be obtained as follows:
denote equilibrium set of unconstrained companies except company-n, i.e.,
Given strategies of other companies, b , − ∈ Ω , the market clearing price can be obtained as follows:
Obtaining Candidates of Nash Equilibrium and Their Feasibilities Check
In the previous section, best responses of individual companies at a given equilibrium set pair ( )
Ω Ω are derived. In this section, a practical way to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine From the equation above, the residual demand of company-n, that is, the amount of demand which company-n is facing, can be obtained as follows:
their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums is given. It is shown that how a feasible space for equilibrium set pairs is defined and the feasibilities of the individual equilibrium set pairs in the feasible space are checked as Nash equilibriums.
It can be seen that, at any given equilibrium set pair, a condition is needed to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium set of constrained companies at that pair. In the uniform pricing auction model described above, the lowest equilibrium market clearing price, p , can be obtained when all companies are in the equilibrium set of constrained companies, while the highest equilibrium market clearing price, p , can be obtained when all companies are in the equilibrium set of unconstrained companies.
However, it should be noted that company-n cannot be in the equilibrium set of constrained companies at any given equilibrium set pair if market clearing price at that equilibrium, p , is less than n n q γ . That is, for an example, suppose that company-n is in the equilibrium set of constrained companies and market clearing price p is less than n n q γ . Then, this assumption gives a relationship as n n n n p q b q γ ≤ < and this inequality implies that the marginal revenue is less than the marginal cost of company-n. Therefore, company-n loses its money by selling its marginal generation unit.
In this case, the company will try to decrease its generation and it can only be done by choosing b large enough to transfer its state from set of constrained companies to unconstrained companies. Therefore, the best response of company-n cannot exist in the equilibrium set of constrained companies and this implies that any Nash equilibrium cannot be reached with company-n's constrained equilibrium state. Therefore, the following condition is needed to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium set of constrained companies at a given equilibrium set pair:
Let denote a set of companies that can remain in the equilibrium set of constrained companies in a Nash equilibrium, in the sense of marginal profit (i.e., is greater than
Then, a set of candidates of equilibrium set pairs, Λ , can be obtained and this set implies a feasible space for equilibrium set pairs for the problem. For each equilibrium set pair in the set, , it will be checked whether it satisfies the condition in (10) and equilibrium set pairs satisfying (10) can be confirmed as Nash equilibriums after another examination which is presented in the following section. The number of elements of The possibility of a candidate equilibrium set pair as Nash equilibrium can be checked using the condition described in (10). That is, for a given equilibrium set pair ( )
Ω Ω , it can be checked there is a possibility that this equilibrium set pair will be Nash equilibrium, by comparing
and the corresponding equilibrium market clearing price. Therefore, if market clearing price at the given equilibrium set pair is less than
, the equilibrium set pair cannot result in Nash equilibrium and this pair will not considered in further examinations any longer. The procedure to obtain a set of feasible equilibrium set pairs and to check its possibility of being Nash equilibrium is summarized as follows: 1) Without loss of generality, it can be assumed that companies are ordered by the increasing order of the parameter , n ∈Ω , that is,
since otherwise companies can be ordered.
2) Obtain the maximum market clearing price p .
3) Find an index R such as
4) Obtain a set of companies, Ω = . {1, , } R R 5) Obtain a set of candidates of equilibrium set pairs, 
NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
Market Data
In the numerical example, three generation companies are considered and the inverse demand function is given as p = 25 -0.01q, where q is the total supply such as 1 23 = + + . The parameter for each company is illustrated in Table 1 .
Solution Procedure
Step 1; The given company index have been ordered already.
Step 2; Λ is obtained as follows:
{ } Step 3; Nash conditions for each candidate Nash equilibrium set pair are examined as follows:
Since every company is in the constrained state, the corresponding generation is its maximum generation. Therefore, total generation is the sum of maximum generations and the corresponding value is 2000. By the demand function, the market clearing price can be obtained as follows: 25 0.01 2000 5 p= − × =
The maximum marginal cost at the maximum generation level in Ω is acquired as company-3's marginal cost at the maximum generation level, 11.057. Based on (9), this candidate cannot be Nash, because the company-3's marginal cost at the maximum generation level is greater than the market clearing price p. The maximum marginal cost in Ω is 11.057 and this is greater than the price above. So, this cannot be Nash equilibrium because it does not meet (9). 
∑
The corresponding market clearing price is obtained as follows:
There is no company in C Ω , so this equilibrium meets the condition (9). Generation quantity which is allocated each generation company can be obtained from (3) as follows: Step 4; Now the deviation of each company can be examined. For company-1, the reasonable deviation is to decrease its slope of bid curve and to be included in C Ω . In this case, the deviated price is 10.2345, the deviated quantity is its maximum quantity 400 and the corresponding deviated payoff is 2339, which is less than the original payoff, 2342.8. For company-2, the reasonable deviation is to decrease its slope of bid curve and to be included in C Ω . In this case, the deviated price is 9.6092, the deviated quantity is its maximum generation 600 and the corresponding deviated payoff is 2645.8, which is less than the original payoff, 2917.6. Company-3's reasonable deviation is also to decrease its slope of bid curve and to be included in Ω . In this case, the deviated price is 8.2388, the deviated quantity is its maximum generation 1000 and the corresponding deviated payoff is 2710.3, which is less than the original payoff, 4277. Since this candidate satisfy all the Nash conditions, this will result in Nash equilibrium and the following is the quantities of this Nash equilibrium: , 384.5723, 461.5247, 622.9607 Nash Nash Nash= Since every possible candidate for Nash equilibrium is explored, this Nash equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Results
From the analysis above, the unique Nash equilibrium can be obtained. The corresponding Nash quantities for this numerical example are illustrated in Table 2 . 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, the characteristics of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modeled by uniform pricing auctions are analyzed and new methods for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auction are proposed. Based on the residual demand curve, an efficient way to obtain all the possible equilibrium set pairs and to examine their feasibilities as Nash equilibriums is suggested. A simple numerical example with three generation companies is demonstrated to show the basic idea of the proposed theory. As this paper is focused on the analytical study of equilibrium of N-company generation markets, the applicability of the proposed method to the real-world problem can be seen, theoretically.
